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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WILL MEDICARE WITHER ON THE VINE? HOW CONGRESS HAS
ADVANTAGED MEDICARE ADVANTAGE—AND WHAT’S A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD ANYWAY?
ROBERT A. BERENSON* AND MELISSA M. GOLDSTEIN**

I. BACKGROUND
Congress is actively debating whether to reduce current overpayments to
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans.1 In 2007, overpayments, i.e., the amount
that MA plans receive in aggregate over what it would otherwise cost to
cover the same beneficiaries under the traditional fee-for-service Medicare
program,2 are estimated by government agencies to be 12%3 and by an
independent researcher to be 13.3%.4 The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimates that reducing these overpayments to the level of local per
capita spending in traditional Medicare would save $65 billion over the next
five years and $160 billion over the next ten years.5
* M.D.; Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute.
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and Health Services, Department of Health Sciences, School of Medicine and Health Sciences,
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1. Robert Pear, Democrats Press House to Push to Expand Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2007, at A1.
2. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 243 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar07_Entire
Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007]
(discussing the concept of payment neutrality and that payments to MA programs are above
FFS levels).
3. Id. at 243, 244 tbl.4.1; The Medicare Advantage Program, Trends and Options:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong.
4 (2007) [hereinafter MA Hearing] (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional
Budget Office), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/Testimony
32107/OrszagTestimony.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
4. BRIAN BILES & EMILY ADRION, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION:
EXTRA PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, UPDATED TABLES FOR 2007, tbl.1, (May 2007),
available at www.ocpp.org/2007/Commonwealth_Brian_Biles_2007_Updated_tables.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
5. MA Hearing, supra note 3, at 13.
5
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Critics believe that these substantial overpayments to MA plans are
unwarranted at a time of budget deficits and that this money can be used to
fund other important programs, such as the Children’s Health Insurance
Program, and help forestall an anticipated 10% reduction in Medicare
Recent criticism states that systematic
payments to physicians.6
overpayments undermine and threaten the future of the traditional Medicare
program by enticing beneficiaries to leave the traditional program and enter
into an MA plan.7 Annually, MA plans receive approximately $1,000 per
beneficiary in overpayments that they can use to offer extra benefits at no
cost to beneficiaries.8 Medicare rules require plans to use the overpayments
to buy-down beneficiary cost sharing, provide catastrophic coverage, and
offer extra benefits, e.g., prevention services, eye glasses, hearing aids, and
supplemental prescription drug benefits.9 Using part of the overpayments,
MA plans provide more attractive prescription drug benefits than traditional
Medicare, including substantially lower front-end premiums, some coverage
in the infamous Part D “doughnut hole,” and somewhat more generous
brand-name drug coverage.10

6. Pear, supra note 1. See generally NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY &
MEDICARE, ATTACK ON MEDICARE: PRIVATE HEALTH PLAN SUBSIDIES WINDFALL FOR CORPORATE
AMERICA (2007), at www.ncpssm.org/news/archive/vp_medicare_advantage/ (last visited Sept.
16, 2007) (discussing various perceived problems that result from plan overpayments,
including the increase in Part B premiums for beneficiaries).
7. NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE, supra note 6.
8. See BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: EXTRA
PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS – UPDATED AND REVISED 2 (2006), available at
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Biles_costprivatizationextrapayMAplans_970_ib.pdf?
section=4039 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (stating that the average 2005 overpayment per
MA plan beneficiary was $992); BILES & ADRION, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that the average
2007 overpayment per MA plan beneficiary was $1,008); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, at 11 (2007) available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/partnerships/downloads/MedicareAdvantage2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2007) [hereinafter CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007] (stating that in 2007, on average,
MA beneficiaries will receive $86 worth of additional benefits per month).
9. CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, supra note 8. See generally MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMM’N, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS (2004),
available at www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Dec04_CostSharing.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT]
(discussing the flexibility MA plans give managed care organizations in designing benefits
packages).
10. MARSHA GOLD, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT:
PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING FEATURES IN MEDICARE’S NEW PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAM 5,
11, 17 (2006), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7517.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2007); see also MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 253-59, 259
tbl.4.10.
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The extra benefits that MA plans provide entice both low-income
beneficiaries without Medicaid or retiree supplemental insurance and those
who can afford a supplemental Medigap plan to choose an MA plan and
leave traditional Medicare.11 Indeed, of these beneficiaries who lack
supplemental insurance (labeled active choosers), those with lower incomes
and ethnic minorities are disproportionately likely to select MA plans,
although the difference in enrollment compared with white and higherincome beneficiaries is not great.12 MA plans are able to attract active
choosers disproportionately because they can convert extra payments they
receive into extra benefits, not because the plans are more efficient and
thereby able to provide extra benefits.13 In the aftermath of the Medicare

11. See ADAM ATHERLY & KENNETH E. THORPE, BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, VALUE OF
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE TO LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 6 (2005),
available at www.bcbs.com/issues/medicaid/research/Value-of-Medicare-Advantage-to-LowIncome-and-Minority-Medicare-Beneficiaries.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
12. Id. at 3-4; see also CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, supra note 8, at 9. In
criticizing these findings, others have analyzed the data without excluding beneficiaries on
Medicaid and found that low-income and minority beneficiaries do not disproportionately
enroll in Medicare plans. See, e.g., EDWIN PARK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY BENEFICIARIES DO NOT RELY DISPROPORTIONATELY
ON MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS: INDUSTRY CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT BILLIONS IN OVERPAYMENTS
RESTS ON DISTORTIONS 3-5 (2007), available at www.cbpp.org/4-3-07health.pdf (last visited
Sept. 19, 2007).
13. There is confusion and disagreement over whether MA plans are more efficient than
the traditional Medicare program. Using 2004 data from adjusted community rate filings,
CBO found that MA plans required 103% of traditional Medicare spending to provide the
statutory Medicare Part A and Part B benefits. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DESIGNING A PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE 11 (2006), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7697/
12-08-Medicare.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) [hereinafter CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE]. Using 2006 bids made by plans to provide Parts A and B
benefits, MedPAC estimated that MA plans provide those benefits at 99% of Medicare’s costs
and that health maintenance organizations (HMOs), the predominant MA plan, are able to do
so at 97%. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: PROMOTING
GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 63 tbl.3-1, 64 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/
documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC,
PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE]. As emphasized in the CBO’s report, these
analyses are sensitive to differences in beneficiaries’ underlying health status. Therefore, the
CBO tried to remove those differences by adjusting plan costs according to health risk. CBO,
DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra. Another factor confounding the
analysis of MA plan efficiency relative to traditional Medicare is that plans disproportionately
serve counties where traditional Medicare spending is relatively high because payments to MA
plans are based, at least to an extent, on traditional Medicare spending. Id. at 12.
Nevertheless, until adjustments are made for the geographic distribution of plans, MedPAC’s
analysis will not be able to offer a conclusion about whether plans are actually more efficient
at providing Parts A and B benefits than traditional Medicare.
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Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA),14
which substantially increased payments made to MA plans, “[t]he number of
Medicare enrollees in private health plans increased from 5.3 million
(across 285 contracts) in 2003 to 8.7 million (across 602 contracts) as of
June 2007.”15 MA enrollment rose slightly in July to 8.8 million, bringing
the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in private plans to exactly
20%.16
Observers have recently focused their criticisms on the possibility that the
systematic overpayments and other advantages the MA plans enjoy, which
this article discusses, will tilt the “playing field” in favor of private plans.17
Their concern is that a long-term tilt could lead to the demise of the
traditional Medicare program without Congress and the public ever
debating the merits of this shift that would effectively privatize the program.18
Giving beneficiaries the incentive to leave traditional Medicare for a private
plan carries out former Speaker Gingrich’s pronounced strategy to have
traditional Medicare “wither on the vine” through the voluntary decisions of
Medicare beneficiaries.19 Ideological conservatives agree with liberal critics
that the stakes involved in the political battle over Medicare Advantage are
high. In an opposite editorial titled How the GOP Won Health Care,
Holman Jenkins, a member of the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board,

14. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
15. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 1 (2007),
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
16. Stephanie Peterson & Marsha Gold, Tracking Medicare Health and Prescription Drug
Plans: Monthly Report for July 2007, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Aug. 3, 2007, at 1, available at
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/medicaretracking0707.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
17. See, e.g., Trudy Lieberman, The Medicare Privatization Scam, THE NATION, July
16/23, 2007, at 14, 20 (contending that Congress is slowly draining Medicare to create a
more privatized system and that, with some MA plans, seniors may pay more out of pocket
than they would under traditional Medicare).
18. When the MMA was being debated, the issues that drew the most comments were
those related to the structure and cost of the Part D drug benefit, including its “doughnut hole”
in coverage, the “non-interference” clause precluding price negotiations between the
government and the pharmaceutical companies, and its overall cost. See id. at 14; Paul
Krugman, The Plot Against Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A23; Robert A. Berenson,
Doctoring Healthcare II: Yo, Democrats! Medicare is Privatizing!, 18 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
13 (Jan./Feb. 2007) (discussing concerns that the un-level playing field could effectively
privatize Medicare without receiving public attention).
19. On October 24, 1995, Gingrich explained the Republican strategy regarding
Medicare. He said, “‘Now, we don’t get rid of it in round one because we don’t think that’s
politically smart, and we don’t think that’s the right way to go through a transition. But we
believe it’s going to wither on the vine.’” Adam Clymer, The Ad Campaign: Organized Labor
Goes on the Offensive and the Republicans Cry Foul, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at A8.
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argued that Democrats correctly accused Republicans of privatizing
Medicare by turning it into a voucher program.20
The CBO’s most recent projection calls for MA enrollment to “grow at
an annual average rate of about 7 percent over the next 10 years,
compared with a growth rate of about 2.5 percent for Medicare overall—
reaching 21 percent of total enrollment in 2008 and 26 percent by
2017.”21 However, these projections might well be conservative. From July
2006 to July 2007, enrollment in MA increased from 7.3 million to 8.8
million, a growth of 20% in just one year.22 Additionally, after the MMA was
enacted, the CBO initially projected virtually no increase in MA plan
enrollment.23 Without changes in overpayments and the other advantages
enjoyed by MA plans, MA enrollment growth might reach a “tipping point”
where traditional Medicare will no longer be able to function in many areas.
Critics predict that traditional Medicare’s risk pool will be compromised “as
those with greater health care needs remain in the traditional program,
paying . . . higher Part B premiums to subsidize overpayments to [MA]
plans.”24 Critics are also concerned that substitution of an array of private
plans25 will allow the program to alter its fundamental character from a
social health insurance program providing a defined benefit to a voucherlike program offering beneficiaries a defined contribution to use in selecting
among only private insurance plans.26 A voucher-like program is a longstanding goal of ideologically conservative Medicare reformers.27
20. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How the GOP Won Health Care, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2007,
at A16 (arguing that, with the extra payments provided to MA plans and the new Medicare
drug benefit, “Republicans have usurped Democrats’ role as Santa Claus to the middle
class”).
21. J. TIMOTHY GRONNIGER & ROBERT A. SUNSHINE, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE: PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS IN MEDICARE 3 (June 2007), available at www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/82xx/doc8268/06-28-Medicare_Advantage.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
22. Peterson & Gold, supra note 16.
23. Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Disadvantaged and the Search for the Elusive ‘Level
Playing Field,’ 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-572, w4-576, available at http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.572v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (discussing how
most estimates were inappropriately conservative because they missed the dramatic increase
in the enrollment in private fee-for-service (PFFS) option, which is the fastest growing MA
option).
24. NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE, supra note 6.
25. This includes the PFFS option, which is the fastest growing MA plan and attempts to
mirror traditional Medicare’s open access to all providers.
26. See Stuart M. Butler & Robert E. Moffit, The FEHBP as a Model for a New Medicare
Program, 14 HEALTH AFF. 47, 51-52 (1995), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/14/4/47.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
27. See generally id. at 47-61. A somewhat modified defined contribution approach,
labeled “premium support,” has been proposed by many since it was initially suggested in an
influential Health Affairs article. See Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The Medicare
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Many healthcare system stakeholders have expressed increasing doubts
about the ability of the market, generally, and private health plans,
specifically, to address ongoing problems of escalating costs and mediocre
quality and are looking for the government to serve a greater role as a
steward of improving the system.28 In the MMA, Congress ignored these
views and moved the other direction, threatening the very survival of the
relatively successful traditional Medicare program. This fundamental threat
to the program comes as scholars increasingly are calling for expansion of
traditional Medicare to serve either as a third-party administrator for selffunded employers29 or as the basis for a national health system offering an
array of private plans and a strong government-run program.30 However,
an un-level playing field in Medicare would undermine these promising
proposals.
Whether within the context of the current Medicare program or in visions
of a “Medicare for all” program, it is important to define what constitutes a
level playing field.31 Even some of the current proposals for moving
Medicare to a premium support model call for an explicit and important role
for traditional Medicare.32 Although the current payment system for MA

Reform Debate: What is the Next Step?, 14 HEALTH AFF. 8, 20-22 (1995), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/14/4/8.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). For a
detailed exploration of how premium support would work, see CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 3-6.
28. Len M. Nichols et al., Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health
Care Systems? Confidence is Waning, 23 HEALTH AFF. 8, 11-15 (2004), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/23/2/8.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
Commenting on this paper, Alain Enthoven, one of the main architects of managed
competition, lamented the failure of the market to address cost and quality concerns.
Enthoven also stated that the country might have to move to “Medicare for all” by default.
Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient Health Care Systems, 23 HEALTH AFF. 25, 2527 (2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/23/2/25 (last visited Sept.
16, 2007). Ironically, program developments resulting from the un-level playing field suggest
Medicare for none.
29. See Joseph White, Protecting Medicare: The Best Defense is a Good Offense, 32 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 221, 223-25 (2007), available at http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/
reprint/32/2/221 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
30. Mark Schlesinger & Jacob S. Hacker, Secret Weapon: The “New” Medicare as a
Route to Health Security, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 247, 271-84 (2007), available at
http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/32/2/247 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
31. While some on the Right might prefer the elimination of a government-run program
altogether, some on the Left seek a single-payor program that has no role for private health
insurance, resembling the Canadian healthcare system.
32. Some advocates of major market-based reform in Medicare, based on premium
support, have called for the traditional Medicare program to serve a major role as one of the
competitors. Before the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Stuart M. Butler from the Heritage
Foundation testified,
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plans and a premium support system share some elements, they differ
significantly in that the current system treats private plans differently from the
traditional program.33 Under a premium support model, the traditional
program’s and private plans’ payments would be established on the same
basis.34 The government’s contribution would either be determined from the
plans’ bids, with the “bid” of the traditional program treated like a private
plan bid, or set at a predetermined level.35 Consequently, enrollees in
traditional Medicare could be required to pay higher or lower premiums
than they currently face, depending on the traditional program’s bid.36
Whether the traditional program would be expected to be a passive
payer, whose bid simply reflects its actual payments, or an active bidder,
with an opportunity to use the bidding process to manage costs within

Because of the statutory basis of the fee-for-service benefits package and the
many requirements Congress places on HCFA [CMS], it is currently very difficult for the
agency to make improvements in the fee-for-service program so that it becomes more
competitive and modern. Thus, the fee for service [program] is inherently at a
disadvantage when competing with the more flexible private plans now being made
available to seniors.
....
. . . Whenever a competitive market is introduced, the government-provided
service must be given every opportunity to redesign itself to compete effectively.
Restructuring Medicare for the Next Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Stuart M. Butler, Vice President for Domestic and Policy Studies,
The Heritage Foundation), at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/Test052799.cfm?
renderforprint=1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). The testimony did not address the issue of
payment equity. At the time, payments to private plans were slightly less than traditional
Medicare payments before considering the impact of favorable risk selection that plans
experience. See Robert A. Berenson, Medicare+Choice: Doubling or Disappearing?, 2001
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W65, W76, W79, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w1.65v1 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (discussing the role of traditional
Medicare in premium support proposals); see also Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd, Structuring
Choice Under Medicare, in MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY
75-124 (Robert D. Reischauer et al. eds., 1998). Not all such proposals contemplate a role
for traditional Medicare as a plan option. See THOMAS RICE & KATHERINE A. DESMOND, THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., AN ANALYSIS OF REFORMING MEDICARE THROUGH A “PREMIUM
SUPPORT” PROGRAM 8 (2002), available at www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/
commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14147 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
33. Currently, beneficiaries who receive their care in the traditional program pay a
monthly premium for that coverage equal to a percentage of national per capita Medicare
spending. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r (2000). Beneficiaries who enroll in private plans receive a
rebate or pay a surcharge, depending on whether their selected plan’s bid is below or above
a benchmark that is constrained to be at least as high as local, county-level per capita
traditional program spending. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
34. RICE & DESMOND, supra note 32.
35. Id.; CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 3.
36. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 2-3.
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particular geographic areas, is unclear. Although the issues in permitting
traditional Medicare to become an active value-based purchaser are
beyond the scope of this article, there have been attempts to identify
purchasing opportunities for the traditional program.37
This article attempts to analyze why the current playing field for
competition between traditional Medicare and private health plans is
severely tilted in favor of the plans. Current public debate has focused
mostly on overpayments. This article begins with an exploration of how the
payments can be modified to promote payment equity. However, other
important but less-discussed factors contribute to the un-level playing field.
In turn, this article considers the following issues: benefits flexibility,
including the concept of actuarial equivalence that plans take advantage of;
the opportunity plans have to market their products and abuses in
marketing; and the unique advantages enjoyed by private fee-for-service
(PFFS) plans. In each of these areas, this article offers suggestions for
correcting the playing field imbalance. The article concludes with a brief
discussion of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
“boosterism” of private plans, demonstrating the need for even-handedness
in the administration of Medicare.
II. FINANCIAL NEUTRALITY
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), which explicitly
and consistently has supported the concept of a level playing field
competition between the array of private plans and traditional Medicare,
has defined financial neutrality as follows: “the Medicare program should
pay the same amount, adjusting for the risk status of each beneficiary,
regardless of which Medicare option a beneficiary chooses.”38 Recently,
37. There is growing literature on how the traditional Medicare program might be
allowed to better manage costs and improve quality. MedPAC has issued many reports
presenting ideas for value purchasing. For the author’s contributions on the topic, see Robert
A. Berenson, Getting Serious About Excessive Medicare Spending: A Purchasing Model, 2003
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.), W3-586, W3-591 to W3-602 (2003), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.586v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007);
Robert A. Berenson & Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional MedicareShould We? Could We?, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-54 (2002), at
www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl65+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+139+(Autumn+2002) (last
visited Sept. 24, 2007).
38. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2. The actual payments made
to plans are based on plans’ bids against benchmark targets, a system that began in 2006.
Id. at 243. Plans that want to participate as MA plans must submit bids indicating the per
capita payment for which they are willing to provide Medicare Part A and Part B services. Id.
Plans must also submit bids for the voluntary Part D prescription drug benefit and for
premiums for any supplemental benefits they intend to offer. Id. at 253. Plans are paid their
bids plus 75% of the amount by which the applicable benchmark exceeds their bid. Id. at
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MedPAC clarified that their position on financial neutrality could be
accomplished by payment equivalence in the aggregate, with variations in
local rates, or by payment equivalence at the local level, which MedPAC has
long-preferred.39
MedPAC initially adopted the payment neutrality provision in 2001
using the following rationale: “Because health care is delivered in local
markets, payment neutrality needs to be pursued at the local level. Failure
to make payments equal within a local market would give one sector—
either M+C [the Part C program before MA] or traditional FFS—an
First, this definition, which ignores
advantage over the other.”40
overspending in the traditional program and the actual costs of providing
Parts A and B services through MA plans, seems to accept the systematic,
geographically-based overspending in the program41 and essentially passes
it through to the MA sector of Medicare; but, in so doing, the definition tries
to maintain a level playing field.42 MedPAC’s preferred payment neutrality

246. Plans must return the 75% to beneficiaries as additional benefits or as a rebate on their
Part B or Part D premiums. Id. Plans that bid above the benchmark are required to charge
enrollees the full difference between the bid and benchmark as an additional premium. Id. at
243, 247. The 25% government retention, which is effectively a tax on low bids, explains why
MedPAC estimates that benchmarks in 2006 were set 116% above traditional program
spending and actual payments at 112%. Id. at 246-47. Independently, the CBO similarly
concluded that the benchmarks for 2007 were 117% and payments 112% of traditional
Medicare. MA Hearing, supra note 3.
39. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 252. Operationally,
payment at the local level means at the county level because CMS collects well-defined,
county-level, per-capita costs and can make other payment adjustments for beneficiary health
status and for indirect medical education payments at the county level. Id. at 243, 252.
40. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 112-13 (2001), available at http://medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/
Mar01%20Ch7.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). It is interesting to note that MEDPAC’s
predecessor, the Physician Payment Review Committee (PPRC), took a different position on
financial neutrality at the local level. In its March 1997 Annual Report, PPRC stated,
Many observers think current policies [financial neutrality at the country level] limit the
growth of Medicare managed care by paying too little in some markets and promoting
it in others by paying more than necessary to compensate plans fairly. In any case,
these policies hamper Medicare’s ability to benefit from the efficiencies of managed
care. Moreover, they do not encourage beneficiaries to make cost-conscious choices.
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS xxi (1997).
41. See generally John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare
Reform, 2002 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W96, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w2.96v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (showing that more than two-fold
differences in spending does not produce important differences in quality of care).
42. An approach that would deviate from a level playing field would attempt to achieve
savings from the potential efficiencies of private plans. For example, the competitive pricing
demonstration model that CMS attempted to implement featured competitive bidding by
health plans in a local area against each other. It did not refer to spending in the traditional
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formulation would represent a substantial spending improvement over the
current MMA payment formula, which pays MA plans 112% of traditional
Medicare in aggregate and substantially more in some counties,43 and
would generate substantial program savings.44
Second, there is growing evidence that even traditional Medicare per
capita spending, as calculated at the county level, provides payments that
far exceed plan costs (including a reasonable profit), at least in those
counties where plans are disproportionately represented (precisely because
the payment levels have been so generous).45 For many years, policy
analysts have thought that plan costs do not vary the same way that
traditional Medicare spending varies.46 For example, over the many years
when plans received formula-based payments, their benefits varied directly
with their CMS payments, which were based on local traditional program
expenditure levels.47 This fact indicates that private plan costs do not vary
as much as the traditional program spending.48

program, which might save substantially more as plans have an incentive to bid low to obtain
business. Before the Denver demonstration of competitive pricing was cancelled by court
order, the available bids “were found to be 24 to 38 percent below the prevailing payment
rate at the time (which was set at 95 percent of the cost of care in [traditional] Medicare,
adjusted for beneficiary risk).” Bryan E. Dowd et al., Fee-for-Service Medicare in a
Competitive Market Environment, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 113, 117 (2005-2006).
The health insurance industry argues, with some justification, that competitive bids from private
plans without reference to traditional Medicare represents a tilted playing field, but, in this
case, tilted to favor traditional Medicare, resulting in withdrawal of many plans from the
program and an inability of plans to offer the additional benefits that many beneficiaries seek.
Karen Ignagni, Putting Principles First: A Better Way to Carry Out a Demonstration, 19 HEALTH
AFF. 44, 46 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/19/5/44.pdf (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007).
43. BILES ET AL., supra note 8, at 2; see also BILES & ADRION, supra note 4 (finding that, on
average, MA plans were paid about 18% more than traditional programs costs in rural “floor”
counties and 21% more in urban “floor” counties. Payments in some counties were
substantially more than these averages).
44. MA Hearing, supra note 3, at 5. MedPAC further suggests the amount of
overpayments will actually increase in the near term because enrollment trends toward MA
plans are disproportionate in areas of the country with relatively high benchmarks in relation
to traditional Medicare. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra
note 13, at 58-64. However, this projection does not take into account the trend in health
plan reporting of enrollee risk. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
45. Kenneth E. Thorpe & Adam Atherly, Reforming Medicare: Impacts on Federal
Spending and Choice of Health Plans, 2001 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W51, W54, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w1.51v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
46. See id. at W51-52 (“Under the current system, payments for M+C plans are
unrelated to plans’ underlying costs. Instead, payments are derived from costs in the fee-forservice (FFS) sector.”); Berenson, supra note 32, at W72-73.
47. Dowd et al., supra note 42, at 120.
48. Id.
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CBO’s recent study, Designing a Premium Support System for Medicare,
confirms these analysts’ suspicions and explains why payment neutrality at
the local level is an analytically flawed recommendation.49 In the study,
CBO compared plans’ projected per capita costs of providing Medicare
Parts A and B benefits as reported in their adjusted community rate (ACR)
submissions, which project plan per capita revenue requirements for
delivering Medicare’s covered benefits and the per capita costs adjusting for
enrollees’ health status using the standard CMS approach.50 Put simply, the
CBO data shows that plan costs do not vary geographically the same way
traditional Medicare costs vary.
This lack of correlation between variations in plan costs and traditional
Medicare spending should come as no surprise if one considers the major
components of costs: administrative costs, price of services, and utilization
of services. Health plan costs mainly consist of administrative costs,
including profit and reserves, and payments to providers for medical care.51
Medical care costs are determined by prices paid for services and the
volume of services provided.52
CBO found that plans’ “[a]dministrative costs . . . account for about 11
percent of private plans’ costs of delivering Medicare benefits, whereas the
administrative costs of the [traditional] Medicare program . . . account for
less than 2 percent of its expenditures.”53 Although there may be some
variable cost in the 11%, perhaps associated with the volume of services
provided (e.g., costs of claims administration, medical management, or
marketing in a competitive environment), a reasonable assumption is that
most of the administrative costs do not vary in relation to geographic

49. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 5.
50. Id. at 10, 42 tbl.5-2 (finding the bids plans submitted for 2006 produced similar
ratios of costs to FFS spending as ACR filings, so that the basic findings do not appear
affected by the absence of ACRs, which provide detail on projected plan costs, and that plan
bids appear to reflect plans’ underlying costs in the same way that formal ACR submissions
do).
51. See CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 12.
Staff and group model HMOs, such as Kaiser-Permanente, typically employ or own some or
all of the providers in the network and, therefore, demonstrate a different cost structure. Most
MA enrollment is in other health insurance models in which the insurer pays contracting
providers for medical care provided.
52. The Government Accountability Office developed a method for disaggregating
medical expenses between prices paid to providers and the use of services by enrollees in the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. This approach might be applied to determining
benchmarks for MA plan bidding. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH
BENEFITS PROGRAM: COMPETITION AND OTHER FACTORS LINKED TO WIDE VARIATION IN HEALTH
CARE PRICES app. I, at 32-48 (2005), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d05856.pdf (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007).
53. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 12.
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variations in traditional program spending.54 In other words, most of the
administrative costs represent a fixed dollar commitment to supporting MA
products, invariant of geographic factors.
With regard to payment rates for services, the prices paid by private
plans to hospitals and physicians are actually “higher in rural and small
metropolitan areas than in large metropolitan areas.”55 One study
conducted for MedPAC found that “the rates paid to physicians by private
plans are an average of 30 percent higher than Medicare’s FFS rates in
small metropolitan areas and rural areas, 10 percent higher in mediumsized metropolitan areas, and 1 percent higher in large metropolitan
areas.”56
This inverse relationship between size of geographic area and prices
makes perfect sense based on the Center for Studying Health System
Change (HSC) findings about market dynamics.57 In recent years, hospitals,
to a great extent, and physicians, to a lesser extent, have developed
strategies, including restraining capacity growth, to gain bargaining
leverage.58 In comparison to providers in competitive urban areas,
providers in rural and smaller urban areas with little provider competition
have an upper hand in negotiating with plans.59
The situation is very different regarding service utilization. Health plans
(except for group- and staff-model health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) such as Kaiser) largely inherit the provider community’s practice
patterns.60 Furthermore, plans have an enhanced opportunity to reduce
spending in higher spending areas by applying managed care techniques,
such as selective contracting based on physician profiling and prior
authorization.61 For purposes of this article, the main point is that it is

54. Id.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. (citing Dyckman & Associates, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Survey of
Health Plans Concerning Physician Fees and Payment Methodology (2003), available at
www.medpac.gov/publications/contractor_reports/Aug03_PhysPaySurvey(cont)Rpt.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2007) (Although this data is not specific to health plans’ MA products, it is
likely that prices vary similarly for these products as well, with the artificially produced PFFS
prices.)).
57. See Paul B. Ginsberg, Competition in Health Care: Its Evolution Over the Past
Decade, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1512, 1518-19 (2005), available at www.healthaffairs.org/RWJ/
Ginsburg_05.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (analyzing the HSC’s observations of healthcare
market forces).
58. Id. at 1518.
59. Id.
60. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 13.
61. Id.
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reasonable to expect a positive correlation between plan and traditional
Medicare utilization patterns, as the CBO has found.62
The CBO analysis showed that MA plans’ bids vary less from county to
county than does per capita traditional program spending.63 As a result, in
areas with high traditional program per capita costs, MA plans’ costs are
relatively low compared with traditional program spending and vice versa.64
In particular, in areas with the highest traditional program spending, both
the benchmarks against which plans bid and the plans’ actual bids deviate
from the idea of financial neutrality at the local county level.65 In these
areas, bids are about 8% above traditional Medicare spending, while in the
lowest-cost traditional program areas, bids are about 21% above traditional
program spending.66
The benchmarks against which MA plans bid do not reflect cost
differences faced by local plans due to local market factors, but, rather, are
artifacts of the specific cost factors faced by the traditional Medicare
program.67 By analyzing the variations in costs as represented by plan bids,
benchmarks can be set that more closely replicate the actual costs plans
face.
Although actual plans’ bids might reflect strategic considerations in
some cases, for purposes of the analyzing relative bids across geographic
areas, plan bids reflect the costs of efficiently providing Medicare benefits. 68
By reviewing bids for all MA plans, except PFFS, for all counties, one can
determine how plan costs vary geographically and how well that variation
correlates with the variation in spending at the county level in traditional
Medicare.69
If plan costs, as reflected in their bids, do in fact vary in the same way
that traditional program county-level spending varies, but, say, are only half
as much as traditional program costs, one could construct benchmarks

62. Id. at 11 tbl.2-1.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id.
65. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 9, 11.
66. Id. at 11.
67. See Berenson, supra note 32, at W76-77 (discussing the linkage between M+C and
the traditional program in determining payments to M+C plans).
68. See Bryan Dowd et al., A Tale of Four Cities: Medicare Reform and Competitive
Pricing, 19 HEALTH AFF. 9, 10 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/19/5/9.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining that the theory behind competitive
pricing is that plans tell the government how much it costs to care for Medicare beneficiaries).
69. One would likely exclude PFFS plans from this calculation because of their legislated
privilege of imposing Medicare prices on providers, thereby artificially altering the local market
conditions—and costs—that all other MA plans face. See infra notes 204–12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of deeming.
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based 50% on the national per capita spending amount and 50% on
county-level spending. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) used a
blend in moving away from county-level payment neutrality, which was the
basis for pre-BBA payments.70 However, the BBA’s 50-50 blend was
selected arbitrarily and not based on the type of analysis proposed here.
Similarly, the county-level payment floors, which are embedded in
benchmark calculations and have dramatically raised benchmarks and,
thus, payments in low traditional Medicare payment areas, were set
arbitrarily without reference to actual costs that plans in those areas face.71
In the hypothetical 50-50 blend between national and county-level rates, the
so-called floor counties would have benchmarks set above the pre-BBA
payment equivalence levels but below the unjustifiably high levels the BBA
produced.72
III. FAVORABLE SELECTION
Numerous studies over nearly two decades have documented that
private plans attract healthier-than-average Medicare beneficiaries. The
evidence comes from papers showing that Medicare beneficiaries in private
HMOs used fewer services before enrolling and had lower mortality rates
and imputed fee-for-service costs while in the plans; and beneficiaries who
disenrolled from the plans had higher use and mortality rates than both
people who remained in plans and those in traditional Medicare.73 In
general, if plans “attract healthier-than-average beneficiaries, the Medicare
program pays more than these same beneficiaries would cost in the
[traditional] program.”74
70. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2000). It is possible, although
unlikely, that the kind of analysis recommended here would show an inconsistent relationship
between health plan costs and traditional Medicare spending levels. If that were the case, any
approach that tied plan bids to traditional program benchmarks, whether the current system,
MedPAC’s preferred approach, or the one proposed here, would be problematic. A different
approach in which benchmarks were set as a function of plan bids only would seem to be
indicated.
71. See CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 9.
72. This provides an analytic approach to accomplishing the objective that the Physician
Payment Review Commission had in recommending a blended payment in their 1997 Report.
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 40, at 65-67.
73. See, e.g., RANDALL BROWN ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH INC., THE MEDICARE
RISK PROGRAM FOR HMOS: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION (1993);
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-161, MEDICARE+CHOICE: PAYMENTS EXCEED COST
OF FEE-FOR-SERVICE BENEFITS, ADDING BILLIONS TO SPENDING (2000), available at
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00161.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
74. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 211 (also arguing that
the opportunity to attract enrollees of varying health status is inequitable among competing
plans).
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The BBA authorized CMS to develop a risk-adjustment mechanism to
adjust payments to plans not only for demographic factors such as age and
gender, but also for the underlying health status of patients.75 CMS chose
to adopt the Hierarchical Condition Codes (HCC) model, which uses
diagnoses recorded on claim forms and submitted by MA plans to CMS and
a given year’s demographic characteristics to assign each beneficiary a risk
score measuring his or her predicted expenditures in the following year
relative to the national average.76
Inadequate risk adjustment distorts competition between private plans
and the traditional Medicare program because “spending is highly
concentrated in a relatively small proportion of the beneficiary
population.”77 While risk adjustment has helped level the playing field by
making plan payments more appropriate for the level of health risk their
enrollees manifest, there are ongoing concerns that the HCC model underadjusts for health status disparity, and that, consequently, plans will still
receive excessive payments as long as they continue to attract relatively
healthy beneficiaries.78 As discussed below, plans can do a number of
things, such as engage in certain market strategies, to continue to attract
relatively healthier beneficiaries or encourage sicker ones to leave the
program.
Whether plans are now attracting a sicker population as they care for a
larger percentage of beneficiaries is not clear. The CBO stated that
between 2003 and 2004, “the average risk score for enrollees in private
plans increased significantly relative to the average risk score for
beneficiaries in the [traditional] program.”79 This increase happened “even
though there was little change during that period in the composition of the

75. Id.
76. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 10.
77. Id. at 26. For example, in 2004, 43% of annual Medicare spending was
attributable to the top 5% of beneficiaries and 15.5% of spending to the top 1% of
beneficiaries. Gerald F. Riley, Long-Term Trends in the Concentration of Medicare Spending,
26 HEALTH AFF. 808, 810 (2007).
78. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A
MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM 43-44, 52-53 (2005), available at www.medpac.gov/
documents/June05_Entire_report.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, ISSUES
IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM]. This report found that although the current risk
adjuster used by CMS is a major improvement over using demographic factors in adjusting
payments to plans for the varying underlying health of enrollees, it still leaves room for
improvement. The risk adjustment model that CMS uses “overpredicts the costliness of
beneficiaries who are in good health and underpredicts for those who are in poor health,”
therefore maintaining the incentive for plans to seek to enroll relatively healthy Medicare
beneficiaries disproportionately. Id. at 53.
79. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 10.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

20

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 1:5

private plans that participate in Medicare or in their enrollment.”80 Risk
scores for MA plan “enrollees estimated from 2003 data were about 12
percent lower than risk scores for enrollees in the [traditional] program, on
average,” but using 2004 data the scores narrowed to approximately 6%.81
Why MA plan risk scores are increasing is unknown. As CBO and
MedPAC stated, “[p]rivate plans may have become better at collecting and
reporting diagnostic information on their enrollees” because they receive
additional dollars in so doing.82 If this is the case, the increasing risk scores
and increased payments might not actually be justified; although, plans
surely have a right to improve their documentation and data submissions to
CMS.83 The complexity of the risk adjustment mechanics requires CMS to
make numerous operational policy decisions related to difficult issues of
data collection and validity, statistical complexity, and potentially different
coding practices among plans and providers in the traditional Medicare
program,84 which together determine the financial impact of risk adjustment
on plans.85
In 2002, CMS made an administrative decision to not take savings from
the phased-in implementation of risk adjustment in 2003 and to extend that
policy for subsequent years when the savings to the government would have
been more substantial as the risk adjustment was being phased in and more
beneficiaries were enrolling in MA plans.86 Such operational decisions can
determine whether plan payments are adjusted to current risk adjustment

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 212
(suggesting that the risk adjustment may be higher than the true risk selection difference
because of coding issues).
83. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 requires that CMS compare the diagnostic coding
patterns of private plans and providers submitting claims in the traditional program, and if
important differences are found, appropriately adjust the payments to plans. Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 48 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23).
84. GRONNIGER & SUNSHINE, supra note 21, at 2.
85. For example, in calculating plan payments, “CMS has to decide what cohort of plans
have submitted acceptable data on which to base risk scores; whether to adjust payment rates
for trends in coding practices in traditional Medicare (so-called [fee-for-service]
normalization); and whether to use lagged or nonlagged data to calculate risk scores.”
Berenson, supra note 23, at W4-578.
86. Id.; see also, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
BENCHMARKS AND PAYMENTS COMPARED WITH AVERAGE MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE SPENDING 3
(2006), available at www.medpac.gov/publications/other_reports/MedPAC_briefs_MA_
relative_payment.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
BENCHMARKS] (stating that this adjustment to not take savings from implementation or risk
adjusted payments has now been “scheduled to fall over time as a result of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005”).
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mechanisms’ maximum potential or, rather, to constitute a discretionary
source of plan overpayments, intentionally tilting the playing field.87
IV. GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN BENEFITS OFFERINGS
Decisions by beneficiaries to leave traditional Medicare for an MA plan
are “driven primarily by the desire for lower premiums or more
comprehensive benefits . . . not because [MA plans] are preferred as a
system of care.”88 The attraction is related to the significant benefits gaps in
Parts A, B, and now D of traditional Medicare. In particular, the traditional
program has substantial cost sharing in the form of premiums, hospital
deductibles, and co-insurance for Part B services, such as physician visits,
and lacks coverage that limits beneficiary exposure to catastrophic
expenses.89 MA plans bidding below the applicable benchmark are able to
provide benefits to enrollees by reducing Parts A and B cost sharing,
reducing the Parts B and D premiums, enhancing Part D benefits, and
providing other benefits, such as vision and hearing screening.90
Other parties attempt to provide complementary insurance to fill in the
gaps in traditional Medicare. According to MedPAC, currently “[a]bout 90
percent of Medicare beneficiaries obtained supplemental coverage in 2003
through former employers (33 percent), [M]edigap policies (25 percent),

87. The administrative decision to forgo savings for favorable selection into plans from
application of the risk-adjustment methodology was never subject to notice, comment rulemaking, or even posted on the CMS Web site, but rather was announced by CMS
Administrator Thomas Scully at a public meeting with health plans. Berenson, supra note 23,
at W4-584 n.29. Called the budget neutrality or hold-harmless provision, the Republican
Congress decided to ratify the administrative decision but to phase it out over four years
beginning in 2007. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2117-19 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-115).
Some argue that authority for not taking the savings from plans for favorable selection derives
from congressional report language for the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999.
MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 211.
88. Karen Davis et al., Medicare Extra: A Comprehensive Benefit Option for Medicare
Beneficiaries, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W5-442, W5-452, (citing CATHY SCHOEN ET AL.,
KAISER/COMMONWEALTH FUND 1997 SURVEY OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (1998), available at
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/medicare_survey97_308.pdf?section=4039
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2007)).
89. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE AT A GLANCE (Feb.
2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
90. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: INCREASING THE
VALUE OF MEDICARE 208 fig.9-2 (2006), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/
Jun06_EntireReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007) (showing that in 2006 MA plans used
about 65% of what they retain from bidding below benchmarks to reduce Parts A and B cost
sharing, 14% to provide additional benefits, 11% to reduce Part D premiums, 5% to enhance
Part D benefits, and 4% to reduce Part B premiums).
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Medicare Advantage plans (13 percent), Medicaid (16 percent), or other
programs (2 percent).”91
The MMA partly addresses Medicare benefit gaps by providing a modest
prescription drug benefit under Part D.92 According to the authors of
Medicare Extra: A Comprehensive Benefit Option for Medicare Beneficiaries,
One of the key structural decisions made in enacting the law was to offer
prescription drug coverage only through private plans, either stand-alone
private drug insurance plans or . . . MA managed care plans. This decision
marks the first time in the program’s history that a Medicare benefit will not
be available though the basic program. With the new, separate Part D drug
benefit, beneficiaries wishing to remain in the traditional fee-for-service . . .
program and still have comprehensive coverage will now need three
separate plans: basic Medicare Parts A and B, for hospital and physician
services; Part D, a private prescription drug plan; and supplemental private
coverage to help cover Medicare’s high cost sharing and protect against
catastrophic costs.93

The patchwork of plans has the potential to create confusion and
adverse selection as healthier beneficiaries select MA plans.94 It can also
lead to higher administrative expenses because of the multiple
administrative entities involved and the lack of integrated claims
administration.95 By requiring beneficiaries to receive prescription drug
coverage from a private insurer, the MMA replaced the previous “two-stop
shopping” with “three-stop shopping” for beneficiaries who otherwise are
satisfied to stay in traditional Medicare.96 Under the MMA, Medigap
insurers can renew policies providing prescription drug benefits only to
beneficiaries who decline to enroll in Part D and cannot issue new
prescription drug benefit policies.97 Thus, these limitations on prescription
drug coverage in the long-standing Medigap supplemental market actually
reduce choice for beneficiaries.
Some architects of the MMA specifically worked to accentuate thenexisting structural advantages given to private plans. In his 2003 State of

91. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 6. Note that the
percentage of beneficiaries in MA has increased from 13% in 2003 to 20% in July 2007. See
supra text accompanying note 15.
92. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101 – 152 (Supp. IV 2004).
93. Davis et al., supra note 88, at W5-442.
94. Id.
95. Id. at W5-442 to W5-443 (citing MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: ASSESSING MEDICARE BENEFITS (2002), available at www.medpac.gov/
documents/Jun02_Entire%20report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007)).
96. Berenson, supra note 23.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(v) (Supp. IV 2004).
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the Union address, President Bush proposed that beneficiaries could receive
comprehensive prescription drug benefits only if they joined a private plan;
those remaining in traditional Medicare would not receive as generous of
coverage.98 This proposal explicitly favored private plans. Although the tilt
was politically unsustainable, the actual MMA language still provides a very
real opportunity for private plans to exploit advantages the system’s structure
afforded them by offering one-stop shopping and using the overpayments
they receive to offer extra benefits.
Because the same private plans offering Medicare Advantage also are
offering the stand-alone drug benefit, including prominent insurers like
UnitedHealth Group, WellPoint, and Humana, some beneficiaries will likely
find it simpler to just let the same insurer provide all their care, including
their basic Medicare benefits. Humana has forthrightly acknowledged this
advantage. With its already large presence in both Parts C and D of
Medicare, Humana has developed a “near national” strategy for reaching
virtually all Medicare beneficiaries with a stand-alone drug plan.99 Its goal
is to “ultimately migrate those customers” to more profitable MA plans,100
thereby promoting the simplicity of one-stop shopping.101
The obvious policy approach to leveling the playing field between MA
plans and traditional Medicare in terms of benefit offerings would be to
allow traditional Medicare to offer catastrophic coverage and a Part D plan
directly and to improve coverage of beneficiary cost sharing so that
beneficiaries could have one-stop shopping in the traditional program.102
Even if premiums increased substantially to accommodate an expanded
benefit package, allowing traditional Medicare to offer benefits comparable
to what MA plans provide would present a “genuine market test” and fair
choice.103

98. George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union, (Jan. 28, 2003), at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2007). President Bush subsequently proposed a plan that would have provided beneficiaries
on traditional Medicare with an estimated 10% to 25% savings on prescription drugs and
protection from high out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses. Press Release, White House,
President Announces Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare (Mar. 4, 2003), at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030304-5.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
99. MARSHA GOLD, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRIVATE PLANS IN MEDICARE: A
2007 UPDATE 10 (2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7622.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2007).
100. Berenson, supra note 18, at 15 (quoting Humana’s Chief Executive Officer Mike
McAllister on the rationale for the aggressive strategy to sell Part D stand-alone products).
101. See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying text for evidence of marketing abuses
associated with this migration strategy.
102. Davis et al., supra note 88, at W5-450.
103. Id. at W5-452.
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Analysis suggests that a so-called Part E of Medicare, which represents a
comprehensive benefit option and eliminates the need for beneficiaries to
purchase a private drug plan and Medigap supplemental coverage, is
reasonably economical and would not increase federal costs if supported by
a budget-neutral beneficiary premium.104 Yet, architects of the MMA, who
created the extra payments and structural advantages that MA plans rely on,
act as if the inadequate Medicare benefit package is immutable. This
assumption underlies their arguments in favor of sustaining the un-level
playing field. For example, Senator Charles Grassley, who was Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee when the MMA was enacted, recently
argued why private plans should be favored. He stated,
The original Medicare benefit is set up based on how medicine was
practiced in 1964 . . . .
. . . Traditional fee-for-service Medicare, the Medicare since 1964, by
itself does not provide protection against the cost of catastrophic illness.
Some beneficiaries then buy Medigap insurance for this catastrophic
insurance. Medigap insurance can be expensive for those on fixed incomes.
In contrast, . . . Medicare Advantage plans have catastrophic coverage for
those seniors who want to choose it, and they do it for a much lower
premium than the Medigap add-on to traditional fee-for-service
Medicare.105

Noting that MA plans now serve rural areas and have helped rural
beneficiaries, Senator Grassley commented that an important reason to
favor private plans is to create “rural equity.”106 Yet, this entire argument
assumes that traditional Medicare needs to remain in its original 1965
benefit structure. The obvious solution is not one that Republicans support,
hence their self-fulfilling rationale for tilting the playing field.
V. ACTUARIAL EQUIVALENCE
As already discussed, MA plans are allowed to buy down beneficiary
cost sharing with extra payments they receive above their bids. In addition,
plan benefits do not have to strictly follow cost sharing amounts required in

104. Id. at W5-447 tbl.3. Although Part E could be constructed to not add incremental
federal costs, more of the costs would be “on-budget,” thereby contributing to political
opposition to such an approach.
105. Senator Charles Grassley, Senate Floor Speech Following Passage of H.R. 976
Congressional Record article 21 of 83, at s10762-s10763 (Aug. 2, 2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S10762&dbname
=2007_record (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
106. Id. at s10763.
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the traditional program.107 The benefit packages that plans offer must be
“at least as good as Medicare’s and cover everything Medicare covers, but
they do not have to cover every benefit in the same way.”108 Rather, subject
to CMS review, plans have some flexibility in making their benefits
actuarially equivalent, but not identical, to traditional Medicare benefits so
long as the cost sharing alterations do not result in discrimination on the
basis of health status.109 There have been a few notable instances of cost
sharing that seemed designed to dissuade beneficiaries with particular costly
health problems from enrolling in MA plans or to encourage enrollees to
disenroll because of the substantial out-of-pocket liabilities associated with
their health problems.110 Less is known about whether plans use this
flexibility to systematically determine actuarial equivalence in an attempt to
attract and retain healthier beneficiaries.111
Out-of-pocket spending for plan enrollees with particular health
problems seems to vary greatly from other enrollees’ spending. A recent
Commonwealth Study found that out-of-pocket costs for private plan
members vary widely by health status and plan benefit package.112 The
report shows that in nineteen of eighty-eight MA plans reviewed, out-ofpocket costs for plan members in poor health would actually have been
higher than in traditional Medicare.113
MedPAC’s examination of the issue a few years earlier was inconclusive.
On the one hand, MedPAC found that most of the time, the plans’ ability to
provide extra benefits resulted in reduced cost sharing compared with

107. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: THE FINE PRINT IN MEDICARE PRIVATE
HEALTH PLAN BENEFITS 3 (2007), available at www.medicarerights.org/MA_care_problems.pdf
(last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
108. Id.
109. MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 4; see 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (Supp. IV 2004).
110. See, e.g., Status of the Medicare+Choice Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 53 (2001) (Statement of
Stephanie Sue Stein, Dir., Milwaukee County Dep’t on Aging, Area Agency on Aging for
Milwaukee County, Wis.) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?
IPaddress=162.140.64.181&filename=77455.pdf&directory=/diska/wais/data/107_house_
hearings (discussing UnitedHealthcare’s announcement that it would increase the inpatient
hospital deductible from zero dollars to $350 per day for Milwaukee Medicare+Choice
beneficiaries).
111. MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that
the MMA required MedPAC to conduct a study of the issue).
112. BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE BENEFICIARY OUT-OF-POCKET
COSTS: ARE MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS A BETTER DEAL?, 2 (May 2006), available at
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/927_Biles_MedicarebeneOOPcosts_MA_ib.pdf?
section4039 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
113. Id. at 7.
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traditional Medicare (e.g., for primary care visits).114 However, MedPAC
identified a pattern of plans charging higher cost sharing for self-labeled
“non-discretionary” services associated with established serious conditions,
such as chemotherapy,115 or post-acute care services, such as home health
and skilled nursing.116 In one example, a colo-rectal cancer patient’s
charges for chemotherapy varied from $7,100 under one plan, to $1,990
under a second plan, and $6,500 under a third plan.117 Furthermore, in a
recent study, the American Medical Association found “[m]ore than half of
the physicians report that their patients in a[n MA] HMO or PPO plan were
denied coverage of services typically covered in the traditional Medicare
plan.”118
As one focus of its plan oversight activities, CMS reviews benefit
packages with altered cost sharing. MedPAC recommended that CMS’s
review activities be increased and that CMS be given greater negotiation
authority over the specific benefits provided in benefit packages and more
resources to ensure that biased selection does not occur.119 Nevertheless,
beneficiary advocacy groups continue to argue that “[e]ven with enhanced
payments, private health plans often fail to deliver coverage that a patient
could obtain from Original Medicare.”120
The issue of whether plans skimp on the care they provide because they
are permitted to offer actuarially equivalent, but not identical, benefits is
important primarily because of the need to protect beneficiaries from
extraordinary costs during illnesses.121 However, to the extent that plans are
able to dissuade certain patients from enrolling in the first place or to
encourage them to disenroll when they develop particularly expensive health
problems, this flexibility in whom plans attract based on benefits they offer
also tilts the playing field.122 As noted, risk adjustment currently is an
imperfect approach to addressing the problem.123
114. See MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 24.
115. See id. at 12.
116. See Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 110th Congress 4 (2007) (statement of the Center for Medicare Advocacy,
Inc.), available at www.medicareadvocacy.org/MA_03.26.07.TestimonyOnMAPlans.pdf (last
visited Sept. 21, 2007).
117. MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
118. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Calls for Financial Neutrality in Medicare
Advantage (May 22, 2007), at www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/17602.html (last
visited Sept. 21, 2007).
119. See MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 37.
120. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., supra note 107, at 9.
121. See MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
122. See id. at 30 (noting that disenrollment rates typically have averaged between 10%
and 13%; although, this data is from a period when beneficiaries could disenroll on a monthly
basis). In 2002, the most common reason for disenrollment related to out-of-pocket costs for
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VI. THE ABILITY TO MARKET THEIR PRODUCTS
The traditional Medicare program has an immeasurable and important
advantage over private plans because it has been in operation since 1965,
enjoys a good reputation with beneficiaries and the public, and is the
“default” program that beneficiaries participate in if they do not enroll in
MA. CMS provides a Handbook124 to all beneficiaries, which includes the
general choices between traditional Medicare and the variety of private
plans and is supposed to provide a neutral presentation. Medicare’s Web
site contains detailed information that beneficiaries and their families can
use as an aid in choosing between MA plans and traditional Medicare and
among the various private plans that are available in specific geographic
areas.125
Members of Congress have complained over the past few years that the
materials provided by CMS are confusing and biased in favor of private
plans.126 For example, in 2005, several Congressmen expressed concern
that the 2005 Handbook grouped PFFS plans and traditional Medicare in
the same section and failed to accurately explain the differences between
traditional Medicare and MA plans.127 More recently, Senators complained
of CMS bias in the 2007 Handbook, which states that traditional Medicare
may be more expensive than MA plans but omits that MA plans may have

plan premiums, co-payments, and deductibles. (These data are from a period when plans
were reducing benefits and do not reflect the recent increase in payments that permits more
generous benefit packages.) Id.
123. See MEDPAC, ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM, supra note 78, at 53.
124. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE &
YOU (2007), available at www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2007).
125. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Medicare: Overview (Apr. 20, 2007), at
www.medicare.gov/Choices/overview.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
126. Press Release, U.S. Cong., ‘Medicare and You’ Guide Skews Advice to Seniors (Oct.
25, 2006), available at www.senate.gov/~finance/press/Bpress/2005press/prb102506.pdf
(last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Press Release, U.S. Senate, Comm. on Fin., Baucus Criticizes
Agency Bias Toward Private Medicare Coverage (May 25, 2007), available at
www.senate.gov/~finance/press/Bpress/2007press/prb052507.pdf (last visited Sept. 21,
2007) (noting that Senator Baucus recently reiterated these concerns).
127. Letter from Charles B. Rangel, Ranking Member, Comm. on Ways and Means, John
Dingell, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Henry A. Waxman, Ranking
Member, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Fortney Pete Stark, Ranking Member, Comm. on Ways
and Means, Subcomm. on Health, & Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, Subcomm. on Health to Mark B. McClellan, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 26, 2005), available at www.house.gov/stark/news/109th/letters/
2006%20Handbook%20Letter%20PDF.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
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higher cost sharing on a regular basis and significantly higher costs for
critical services such as hospital care.128
Because of (1) the presumption of enrollment in traditional Medicare, (2)
the supposed objectivity of the Handbook and other information provided by
CMS to beneficiaries, and (3) the need for private plans to distinguish their
own MA plans from those of competitors, it is understandable and
reasonable that private plans actively market their plans and rely on media
advertising and other outlets to inform beneficiaries of the potential
advantages of plan enrollment. Yet, for a number of reasons, MA plans
enjoy several advantages that go beyond the ability to encourage
enrollment by informing beneficiaries about private plan options in general
and the merits of their company’s own plans.
As noted earlier, private plans offer two types of plans: stand-alone Part
D prescription drug plans and Part C MA plans. Many insurers sponsor
both129 and, therefore, can gain special access to Medicare beneficiaries
through their Part D offerings. Some companies specifically strategize to
actively recruit beneficiaries for their prescription drug plans in the hope that
they will later move to the company’s more profitable MA plans.130 The
traditional program, on the other hand, remains a passive bystander
because it is not permitted to offer a drug plan directly other than through
private plans.131
The overpayments to MA plans create strong incentives for insurance
companies to sell these plans instead of other Medicare products (including
Part D plans). MA plans bring in more income than stand-alone drug
plans132 and have higher profit margins.133 To encourage agents to sell MA
plans, insurers pay commissions for MA plans that are five to eight times
higher than what they pay for stand-alone drug plans.134 The financial
128. See U.S. Cong., supra note 126; see also U.S. Senate, Comm. on Fin., supra note
126.
129. See GOLD, supra note 99, at 15.
130. Milt Freudenheim, A Benefit for Insurers: Medicare Drug Plan Feeds More Profitable
Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1 (noting Humana director’s
acknowledgement of his company’s “springboard” policy, saying, “There's [sic] going to be a
lot of people that are going to have Part D cards that are going to become interested in a
Medicare Advantage plan.”).
131. Lieberman, supra note 17, at 16.
132. See id. at 17 (noting that, on average, Humana’s stand-alone drug plans cost
beneficiaries about $100 a year, compared with about $800 for its MA plans).
133. Freudenheim, supra note 130 (noting that Humana estimated its profit margin for
stand-alone drug plans was between 1% and 3%, while its profit margins for MA plans were
between 3% and 5%).
134. DAVID LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., CAL. HEALTH ADVOCATES & MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., AFTER THE
GOLDRUSH: THE MARKETING OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE AND PART D PLANS 5 (2007), available at
www.cahealthadvocates.org/_pdf/advocacy/2007/CHA-MRC-Brief-AfterTheGoldrush-2007-
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incentive created by this commission structure, combined with lax
government enforcement of regulations regarding the marketing and selling
of these plans,135 has created an environment conducive to deceptive
practices bordering on fraud.
Shortly after marketing began in fall 2005 for MA plans that included
the new prescription drug benefit, the government began to receive
complaints about aggressive marketing.136 A news article in January 2006,
which described the financial incentives Humana gave its agents to sell MA
plans instead of stand-alone drug plans, prompted Representative Pete Stark
to ask CMS to enforce its own guidelines and prevent abusive marketing of
the plans.137 At that time, the guidelines prohibited the payment of a higher
commission based on the value of the plan to the sponsor.138 Now,
however, the guidelines acknowledge that higher commissions are paid
based on the volume or value of an agent’s sales and require only that
commissions be based on industry standards and related to the agent’s time
spent marketing the plan.139 Nevertheless, the “rate of payment to a
marketing representative should not vary based on the health status or riskprofile of a beneficiary.”140 These changed guidelines seem to imply that
CMS no longer prohibits higher payments for plans that generate higher

01.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Robert Pear, Oklahoma Chides Insurer in Medicare
Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A14 (noting that Humana pays agents five
times as much commission for selling an MA plan as for selling a prescription drug plan).
135. See LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 12.
136. Robert Pear, Insurers’ Tactics in Marketing Drug Plan Draw Complaints, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2005, at Section 1, 33.
137. Press Release, Pete Stark, U.S. Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, Stark
Calls for Immediate Investigation of Humana and Other Medicare Drug Plans (Jan. 26,
2006), at www.house.gov/stark/news/109th/pressreleases/01-26Humana.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2007).
138. Letter from Fortney Pete Stark, U.S. Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, to
Mark McClellan, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., and Daniel R. Levinson,
Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., (Jan. 26, 2005), available at
www.house.gov/stark/news/109th/letters/20060126_McClellan_Levison_Humana.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2007) (according to Stark’s January 26, 2005 letter to CMS Administrator
Mark McClellan, the 2005 guidelines stated: “The commission rate (i.e., the percentage per
enrollment) should not vary based on the value of the business generated for the Plan Sponsor
paying the commission (e.g., profitability of the book of business).”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES FOR: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS (MAS),
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS (MA-PDS), PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS (PDPS),
AND 1876 COST PLANS 129 (2006), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrug
CovContra/Downloads/FinalMarketingGuidelines.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter
CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES].
139. CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138.
140. Id.
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profits but does still forbid higher payments to agents based on the risk
status of a beneficiary.
Recent congressional hearings included testimony from state officials
who have received thousands of complaints concerning abusive marketing
practices by insurers and their agents selling MA plans.141 Beneficiaries
have complained they were enrolled in MA plans without their knowledge or
consent, threatened with loss of Medicare benefits unless they signed up for
an MA plan, enrolled in an MA plan when they believed they had signed up
for a stand-alone drug plan, or switched to an MA plan that was not
appropriate for them, which sometimes led to higher premiums and cost
sharing than under their previous coverage.142 Insurance agents selling MA
plans have used aggressive marketing tactics such as door-to-door visits
and cold calling, misrepresenting themselves and their products, and selling
to individuals with limited English proficiency or mental impairments despite
not being able to adequately communicate with them. 143 In a recent

141. See Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Medicare
Advantage.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Medicare Advantage Marketing & Sales: Who
Has the Advantage?, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Congress
(2007), at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=274320& (last visited Sept. 21,
2007); Medicare Advantage and the Federal Budget, Hearing Before the H. Budget Comm.,
110th Congress (2007), at www.house.gov/budget_democrats/hearings.htm (last visited Sept.
21, 2007). For example, Lee Harrell, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance for the State of
Mississippi, testified that his agency had “received over 1,000 complaints on Medicare
Advantage alone . . . . These complaints represent at least twice as many complaints as we
normally receive on all other topics combined.” Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare
Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 6 (2007), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Harrell-Testimony.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter
Harrell, Predatory Sales Hearing] (testimony of Lee Harrell, Deputy Commissioner of
Insurance, State of Mississippi).
142. Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Congress 6-7
(2007), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.
Lipschutz-testimony.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Lipschutz, Predatory Sales
Hearing] (statement of David Lipschutz, California Health Advocates).
143. See id. at 5-9. CMS regulations prohibit door-to-door solicitation. 42 C.F.R. §
422.80(e)(1)(iii) (2007); 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(f)(1)(iii). Regulations also require that companies
provide materials in a foreign language when there is a significant non-English speaking
population in the community. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80(c)(5); 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(d)(5). There
have been many complaints of agents going door-to-door, as well as soliciting on the street,
at nursing homes and community centers, and asking Medicare beneficiaries whom they are
visiting to introduce the sales agent to other beneficiaries. See Medicare Advantage Marketing
& Sales: Who Has the Advantage?, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
110th Congress 4 (2007), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr174sd.pdf (last
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survey, thirty-nine states (out of forty-one respondents) said they had
received reports of misrepresentation in the marketing of MA plans, and
twenty-two states reported complaints of outright fraud, such as forged
signatures on plan applications.144
PFFS plans, in particular, have been a magnet for fraud and abuse
because they receive the highest overpayments (an average of 19% above
traditional Medicare payments)145 and because beneficiaries can enroll in
PFFS plans without drug benefits any time of year.146 The problems with
PFFS plan marketing was so severe that seven sponsors signed an
agreement with CMS in June 2007 to voluntarily suspend marketing those
plans until corrective action was taken and fraud investigations were
completed.147 Despite evidence of widespread abuse in the marketing of
non-PFFS plans, no immediate restrictions have been placed on the
marketing of other types of MA plans.148 CMS did propose new rules for
voluntary reporting and enforcement of complaints,149 but recently
announced that the seven plan sponsors who had signed the voluntary
suspension agreement in June have been approved to resume marketing.150
According to CMS Acting Administrator Kerry Weems, the agency conducted
a comprehensive review of the sponsors and found substantial
improvements in both their internal controls and oversight processes that

visited Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Dilweg, Medicare Advantage Marketing Hearing]
(testimony of Sean Dilweg, Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner).
144. Pear, supra note 134.
145. MEDPAC, PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 64; see
also MARISSA GORDON PICARD, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRIVATE
FEE-FOR-SERVICE (PFFS) PLANS: A PRIMER FOR ADVOCATES 25, available at
www.medicareadvocacy.org/MA_PFFSPrimerForAdvocates.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2007);
discussion of PFFS Plans infra Part VII.
146. JONATHAN BLUM ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., AN EXAMINATION OF
MEDICARE PRIVATE FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS 2-3, www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7621.pdf (last
visited Sept. 20, 2007).
147. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Plans Suspend PFFS Marketing: Plans Adopt Strict Guidelines in Response to Deceptive
Marketing Practices (June 15, 2007), available at www.doi.ne.gov/notices/notc2007/
nr0720.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
148. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Proposes Reforms of
Compliance Requirements for Medicare Advantage Plans: Provisions Also Extend to Part D
Prescription Drug Plans (May 21, 2007), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/
press_releases.asp (follow “May 21, 2007” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
149. Id.
150. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Seven Medicare PFFS Plans
are Approved Following Rigorous Marketing Review (Sept. 24, 2007) at www.cms.hhs.gov/
apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=2474 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
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were “consistent with regulations and guidance for Medicare private-fee-forservice plans.”151
In addition, when marketing began for the 2008 benefit year on
October 1, 2007, all PFFS plans became subject to the same standards,
which include, inter alia, requirements that brokers and agents selling the
product pass a written exam to demonstrate an understanding of Medicare
PFFS policies and the products being marketed and that lists of planned
marketing and sales events must be provided to CMS so that CMS can
monitor these events.152 The Agency has likewise promised more than a
dozen new oversight activities of PFFS plans, including creation of a
dedicated monitoring team and a comprehensive rapid-response plan,
enrollment verifications by the Agency of new plan enrollees to ensure they
were not subject to inappropriate marketing activities and understand the
characteristics of a PFFS plan, and coordination with state insurance
departments to share information about agent and broker complaints and
license suspensions.153 Yet, despite these ameliorative actions, complaints
continue to arise regarding marketing of PFFS plans.154
CMS has issued regulations155 and guidance156 for marketing MA plans,
and requires companies to submit marketing materials for approval before
distributing them.157 Insurers are also prohibited from discriminating, or
“cherry-picking,” among potential customers.158 However, Medicare’s
structure gives them incentives to do exactly that, and the regulations and
guidance allow practices that invite abuse and provide advantage. For
example, companies that sell stand-alone drug plans are allowed to market
MA plans and other products, including non-health products, to
Therefore, when a
beneficiaries seeking stand-alone drug plans.159
beneficiary calls an agent or invites an agent into his or her home to discuss
a prescription plan, the agent can take the opportunity to push an MA plan
(which would result in a much higher commission for the agent) or any

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Robert Pear, For Recipients of Medicare, the Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2007, at A1.
155. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80 (2007).
156. See CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138.
157. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80(a); 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(a).
158. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80(e)(1)(ii) (the regulations specifically ban discrimination); see also
CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138 (discussing the fact that “[a]n
individual performing marketing may be in a position to enroll healthier beneficiaries into
specific health plans (or ‘cherry-pick’) . . . Therefore an individual performing marketing must
not ‘cherry pick’”).
159. See CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 112-113.
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number of other products. Not only does this provide an opportunity for
agents to use aggressive sales tactics,160 but it could allow the agent to
market selectively, both at the time of initial enrollment and during later
open enrollment periods.
A potential advantage that plans have in offering both Part C and Part D
products is the ability to “go to school” over the Part D data to better target
Part C enrollment. The CMS marketing guidelines have an express antidiscrimination section that states that “[o]rganizations may not discriminate
based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, health status,
or geographic location within the service area.”161 However, there do not
appear to be explicit prohibitions on plans taking advantage of prescription
drug use patterns by beneficiaries to target enrollment. Plans, for example,
could research whether potential Part C enrollees use particularly costly
medications or whether they are compliant with their prescribed drug
regimens in the Part D plans that the same organizations administer.
Specifically, there are no “fire walls” between Part D and Part C staff to
assure that Part C plans do not gain unfair advantages in targeting
enrollment. Because CMS policing of this type of targeted marketing might
be unrealistic in terms of the resources needed, a regulatory requirement
that plans create such fire walls could be a workable solution to this
particular problem.
As incentives for potential customers to seek information about their
plans, insurance companies are allowed to offer gifts (of up to $15 in value)
and conduct raffles or contests for larger prizes in locations such as WalMart, as long as they are open to the general public.162 The choice of
prizes may even be tailored to appeal to a particular group of people that
the company believes is less likely to use healthcare services.163 Companies
are also allowed to set up information booths at events such as health
fairs,164 and may choose which events to participate in based on the types of
people likely to attend the event. Finally, companies may target a healthy
population by including benefits that appeal to healthier seniors, such as
discounts for health club memberships, or try to discourage sicker
beneficiaries from enrolling by placing annual limits on coverage or

160. See LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 13 (noting that in-home sales visits have the
highest closing rate for customer enrollments).
161. CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 117.
162. See CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 24, 124.
163. See Lipschutz, Predatory Sales Hearing, supra note 142, at 17.
164. CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 121-22.
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imposing high cost sharing for expensive “nondiscretionary” services such as
chemotherapy.165
CMS has been criticized for failing to curb MA marketing abuses until
after Medicare advocacy groups and Congress brought the public’s
attention to the issue,166 calling the Agency’s enforcement capabilities as
well as its neutrality into question. In recent months, however, CMS has
taken action to address the aggressive and abusive marketing problems by
entering into corrective action plans with some of the worst offenders and
proposing new self-reporting requirements and plan-specific enforcement
for companies who market MA plans.167 Despite this promising action, the
enforcement is uneven. For example, many reports of abuses by one insurer
in Oklahoma did not result in corrective action by CMS.168 State officials
have found “chronic and blatant disregard for state regulation and for
senior policyholders,”169 but states’ hands are tied by the federal preemption
of all state regulatory authority over MA plans, except for licensing and
solvency requirements.170 As noted in recent congressional testimony, many
of the misleading and fraudulent practices associated with the marketing of
MA plans are tied to sales agents who are insufficiently trained and
supervised171 and have a significant financial incentive to sell MA plans
instead of Part D drug and Medigap plans. Most recently, CMS revised the
2008 version of its Handbook in an effort to be less biased in favor of MA
plans.172 While the revisions do include information about cost sharing and
165. See MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., supra note 107, at 3; Medicare Advantage and the
Federal Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Congress (2007),
available at www.house.gov/budget_democrats/hearings/2007/Hoven%20Testimony.pdf
(statement of Ardis Hoven, Board of Trustees, American Medical Association ) (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
166. DAVID LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., CAL. HEALTH ADVOCATES & THE MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR, THE
RELUCTANT REGULATOR: CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES’ RESPONSE TO MARKETING
MISCONDUCT BY MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS 1-3 (July 2007), available at
www.cahealthadvocates.org/_pdf/advocacy/2007/CHA-MRC-Regulator-2007-07.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2007).
167. Id. at 2-3; see also Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note
148.
168. LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 7.
169. Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 4 (2007)
(testimony of Kim Holland, Commissioner for the Oklahoma Insurance Department), available
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Holland-Testimony.pdf
(last visited Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Holland, Predatory Sales Hearing].
170. 42 C.F.R. § 422.402 (2007).
171. Harrell, Predatory Sales Hearing, supra note 141, at 2.
172. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE &
YOU (2008), available at www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf (last visited
Jan. 4, 2008).
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the fact that MA plans may be more expensive, the Handbook might still be
criticized as misleading because it presents traditional Medicare as a “plan”
alongside MA plans and states that costs vary by plan without making clear
that costs for certain services, such as hospital care, might be much higher
under an MA plan than traditional Medicare.173
Medicare beneficiary advocacy groups have noted174 that part of the
solution to this problem is to restore state regulatory authority over the
marketing of MA plans, as state insurance commissioners have requested.
175
As a result, on July 26, 2007, Senator Herb Kohl introduced legislation
which would allow states to regulate the marketing and sales of MA plans
and standardize marketing practices.176 Another part of the solution could
be to require training and supervision of sales agents, who are often shortterm employees with little loyalty to the insurance company or to Medicare
beneficiaries. As stated above, CMS took a step in this direction by
requiring all PFFS-plan sales agents to pass a written exam to demonstrate
their understanding of Medicare policies. Certainly, stronger enforcement
of current regulations and guidelines would help, since prohibited sales
practices continue to be reported.
Relying on CMS’s regulatory and enforcement actions to stem the tide of
MA marketing abuses would seem to be futile, despite the Agency’s recent
actions. As Representative Pete Stark, chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee’s Subcommittee on Health, has stated, the move by insurance
companies to voluntarily suspend marketing PFFS plans “will do virtually
nothing to protect Medicare beneficiaries and is a pathetic attempt to preempt Congressional action.”177 Indeed, some have criticized the agency for
acting more as a cheerleader for MA plans than as a neutral regulatory
agency overseeing them.178 However, the structural factors of overpayments
and insurers’ ability to market MA plans form both the incentive for and the

173. See Jeffrey Young, Medicare Pamphlet Now Includes Caveats on Private Plan Benefits,
THE HILL, Nov. 17, 2007, http://thehill.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id
=69861 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
174. LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 9.
175. See, e.g., Holland, Predatory Sales Hearing, supra note 169; Predatory Sales
Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 8 (2007), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Poolman-Testimony.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2007) (testimony of Jim Poolman, North Dakota Insurance
Commissioner); Dilweg, Medicare Advantage Marketing Hearing, supra note 143
(recommending adopting the Medigap regulatory structure for MA plans).
176. Accountability and Transparency in Medicare Marketing Act of 2007, S. 1883, 110th
Cong. (2007).
177. Lieberman, supra note 17, at 20 (emphasis added).
178. LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 2.
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base of the abuse, indicating that congressional action may be the only true
means of rectifying the problem.
VII. THE SPECIAL CASE OF PRIVATE FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS
In order to promote a variety of plan options, the MMA created a
number of preferences for new forms of managed care other than the local
HMO, which had been the staple of private plan contracting in Medicare for
more than twenty years.179 Initial attention was placed on the incentives for
what the MMA called regional preferred provider organizations (R-PPOs).180
To encourage R-PPOs, the “MMA allow[ed] Medicare to share financial risk
with sponsors in 2006 and 2007, provides selected provisions to make it
easier to establish networks in rural areas, and establishes a regional
stabilization fund starting in 2007 to encourage entry of new plans and
retention of existing ones.”181 Also, the MMA sets forth a somewhat different
approach to establishing the benchmarks that plans bid against by basing
the calculations partly on the actual bids submitted by the R-PPOs.182
Despite these provisions, R-PPOs have attracted a relatively small share of
MA enrollment.183
On the other hand, PFFS plans represent the greatest growth in the MA
program despite receiving virtually no attention at the time the MMA was
passed.184 Although PFFS plans were first authorized by the BBA in 1997,185
insurers had little interest in offering them, and beneficiaries had little
interest in enrolling in them. Before the MMA was passed in 2003, PFFS
plan enrollment hovered around 25,000.186 Enrollment has since exploded,

179. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 created the initial riskbased program of contracting with private plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (2000).
180. The CBO and the CMS Office of the Chief Actuary’s (OACT) 2003 disagreement
over the predicted MA enrollment centered on the likely impact of R-PPOs on beneficiary
choice. OACT believed that there would be substantial R-PPO enrollment, while CBO thought
new R-PPO enrollment would be negligible. See GRONNIGER & SUNSHINE, supra note 21.
181. GOLD, supra note 99, at 3. R-PPOs must “serve large areas in the 26 defined
regions comprising one or more states . . . [and] offer the same plan (with the same benefits
and premiums) across the entire region.” Furthermore, they must structure benefits to integrate
cost sharing for Parts A and B and to include an annual out-of-pocket limit on cost sharing for
these benefits. R-PPOs are to be distinguished from local PPOs that are coordinated care
plans able to serve individual counties, not large geographic areas. Id.
182. MEDPAC, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 86, at 1.
183. In July 2007, there were approximately 167,000 R-PPO enrollees. Although the
number had doubled from a year earlier, R-PPO enrollment represented only 2% of MA
enrollment. Peterson & Gold, supra note 16.
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. §1395w-22 (2000).
186. Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007), at http://waysand
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increasing from about 42,000 in September 2004, to 120,000 in July
2005, to 764,000 in July 2006, to 1,661,000 in July 2007.187 Current
PFFS enrollment represents 19% of total MA enrollment and nearly 4% of
the Medicare beneficiary population.188 The CBO estimates that by 2017,
enrollment in PFFS plans will reach 5 million and account for one-third of
total MA enrollment.189
A PFFS plan is an MA plan that
(i) Pays providers of services at a rate determined by the plan on a fee-forservice basis without placing the provider at financial risk; (ii) Does not vary
the rates for a provider based on the utilization of that provider’s services;
and (iii) Does not restrict enrollees’ choices among providers that are
lawfully authorized to provide services and agree to accept the plan’s terms
and conditions of payment.190

The advantages enjoyed by PFFS plans greatly exceed the advantages
described in this article for MA plans in general. The same estimates that
found 12% overpayment for MA plans in aggregate find that PFFS plans
receive 19% more than the cost for covering the same beneficiaries under
the traditional Medicare program, even though PFFS was designed to be a
privately administered version of the traditional Medicare program.191 From

means.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5965 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Neuman, Medicare Advantage Hearing] (statement of Patricia Neuman, VicePresident, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Director, Medicare Policy Project). The first
PFFS contract was approved by CMS in 2000 for Sterling Life Insurance, followed by
PacifiCare in 2001 and Humana in 2003. Thirty-seven plan sponsors had entered the PFFS
market by 2007. As of 2007, there were “482 unique plan designs and premium
combinations in operation” and all beneficiaries now have access to at least one PFFS plan.
BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 7-8.
187. Lindsay Harris, Lori Achman, & Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage and Medicare
Beneficiaries: Monthly Tracking Report for September 2004, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., Oct. 8, 2004, at 1, available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/MedicareAdvantage-Monthly-Tracking-Report-September-2004.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007);
Marsha Gold & Lindsay Harris, Tracking Medicare Health and Prescription Drug Plans:
Monthly Report for July 2005, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Jul. 20, 2005, at 1,
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/TrackingMedicareHealthandPrescriptionDrugPlans
-July202005-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); Peterson & Gold, supra note 16.
188. See Peterson & Gold, supra note 16.
189. GRONNIGER & SUNSHINE, supra note 21.
190. 42 C.F.R §422.4(a)(3) (2007); see also PICARD, supra note 145, at 3.
191. BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 13. The benchmark rate for plan bidding is greater
than the traditional Medicare rate and is derived from a formula set by the BBA and
subsequent legislation that was meant to raise payment levels for private plans operating in
rural areas and small urban markets. Consequently, for many counties, often referred to as
floor counties, the benchmark payment rate is significantly higher than traditional Medicare
county-level spending. Many PFFS sponsors have targeted their offerings toward these floor
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an insurer’s perspective, PFFS has a number of advantages compared with
other MA plans. Unlike R-PPOs that are restricted to operating at the
regional level, PFFS plans are permitted to operate at the county level and,
therefore, can target high payment areas.192 Because they are not required
to have a provider network, PFFS plans enjoy much easier market entry and
relatively low administrative costs.193
Additionally, “firms that currently offer Medigap policies may see [PFFS]
plans as an attractive alternative for their Medigap policyholders, because
they can now offer a government-subsidized source of supplemental
coverage” to reduce monthly premiums.194 Indeed, the PFFS option might
become very popular with employers, both public and private, who offer
health benefits to Medicare-eligible retirees because the plans without
provider networks offer potential for better access for retirees who have
relocated throughout the country.195
Whereas the MMA requires other MA plans to offer Part D prescription
drug benefits, the legislation explicitly exempts PFFS plans from this
requirement.196 Furthermore, the MMA specifically exempts PFFS plans from
provisions that permit CMS to negotiate with MA plans over whether their
bid submissions “‘reasonably and equitably’ reflect the costs of health care
services and supplies provided.”197 This exemption allows PFFS plans to
retain more of their overpayments for administration and profit, rather than
having to pass most of the overpayments on to beneficiaries in the form of
lower cost sharing or extra benefits. Recent evidence finds that PFFS plans
retain about half of the 19% overpayments, even though PFFS incurs much
lower administration costs than a typical MA coordinated-care plan.198
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006199 made an additional
modification to the MA program for 2007 and 2008 to promote enrollment
counties, and most PFFS plan enrollees reside in these areas. Id. at 12-13; see also MEDPAC,
PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 64.
192. Neuman, Medicare Advantage Hearing, supra note 186, at 2; see also BLUM ET AL.,
supra note 146, at 13 (stating that PFFS sponsors have targeted their products toward the
higher paying floor counties and finding that 90% of PFFS plan enrollees reside in these
areas).
193. Neuman, Medicare Advantage Hearing, supra note 186, at 2.
194. Id.
195. Id. However, as discussed infra at notes 216–18 and accompanying text, there are
increasing reports of providers who are refusing to see PFFS patients, thereby undermining the
intent of relying on PFFS plans to offer access equivalent to what traditional Medicare offers.
196. BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 2.
197. Id. at 13.
198. MEDPAC, PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 63 tbl.3-1,
64.
199. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a), 405(a)).
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in certain PFFS plans.200 The new legislation allows “Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in traditional fee-for-service (Original) Medicare a one-time
opportunity to enroll in an MA plan that does not offer the drug benefit at
any time during the year rather than only during the open and annual
enrollment periods from November 15 to March 31.”201
PFFS plans are also exempt from statutory and regulatory patientprotection standards that apply to other MA plans. By virtue of the
“deeming” provision discussed below, PFFS plans may be exempted from an
assessment of whether they have an adequate number of providers in an
area to ensure beneficiary access to care.202 PFFS plans do not have to
establish a program to improve the quality of care provided to enrollees,
but, if they offer Part D, they must establish a drug utilization management
program or medication therapy management program to reduce the risk of
adverse events.203
The most fundamental advantage PFFS plans have over other MA plans,
and the one that demonstrates congressional intent to effectively privatize
Medicare,204 is the “deeming” provision. Because providers in rural and
small urban areas tend to have negotiating leverage over health plans,205
the deeming provision apparently was created to give the plans a nonmarket advantage by effectively giving them regulatory authority over
providers to set payment rates. By statute, a provider is deemed a
contracting provider if, before furnishing services, the provider has been
informed of the patient’s enrollment in the plan and “[h]as either been
informed of the terms and conditions of payment for the services under the
plan, or [i]s given reasonable opportunity to obtain that information.”206
PFFS plans have the option of creating provider networks and may set
payment at any level they agree on with providers participating in such a
network.207 Absent a network, a plan must pay at least the same payment

200. BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 2.
201. This provision specifically helps PFFS plans because they do not have to offer Part D
benefits. Id at 2-3.
202. PICARD, supra note 145, at 15.
203. Id.; see also, BLUM ET AL., supra note 146 (providing comprehensive reviews of how
the requirements for PFFS plans differ from other MA plans).
204. Berenson, supra note 18, at 14.
205. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL PREFERRED PROVIDER
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT 3 (Oct. 2004), available at
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5997/10-27-PPOUnderMedicare.pdf (last visited Sept. 22,
2007).
206. PICARD, supra note 145, at 9-10 (noting that “[b]ecause the ‘reasonable opportunity’
bar is set very low, in practice, providers are generally considered ‘deemed’ if they have been
informed of the patient’s enrollment under the plan before providing treatment”).
207. Id.
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rate as under traditional Medicare, using the same payment methods.208
Most PFFS plans have chosen to deem providers, rather than set up a
network.209
The deeming provision represents an extraordinary opportunity for one
set of private parties, namely health plans, to impose payment rates on
other private parties, namely providers, outside of usual marketplace
negotiations.210 The deeming provision and the 19% overpayment combine
to provide PFFS plans a unique arbitrage opportunity. That is, PFFS plans
receive 19% more than Medicare would pay but are legislatively
empowered to turn around and pay providers at Medicare rates.211 They do
not bear the same costs administering the program as coordinated care MA
plans do because of all the special provisions enacted on their behalf.
Therefore, PFFS plans can either apply most of the excess payments to offer
extra benefits that entice beneficiaries to enroll or keep the extra payments
as profit.212
At first blush from a beneficiary’s point of view, the PFFS option seems
very desirable because a beneficiary does not have to join a plan with a
restricted provider network or one that performs utilization management to
limit services, yet she receives extra benefits. It appears to be a no-lose
opportunity for beneficiaries, and, indeed, insurers have marketed the PFFS
option as a plan that is equivalent to the traditional Medicare program but
with more benefits.213 Thus, it is not surprising that enrollment skyrocketed
once the MMA significantly increased the payments to PFFS plans.

208. Id. at 11-13.
209. MEDPAC, PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 65.
210. See infra notes 214–15 and accompanying text for limitations on the deeming
authority.
211. Although PFFS plans are required to pay at least Medicare rates, some physician
organizations allege that they actually pay less than Medicare would pay and may impose
administrative compliance requirements that are more onerous than Medicare's, leading to
additional practice costs on deemed physicians. See Sue U. Malone, Executive Report:
Physicians Be Aware: Educate Yourselves Regarding Medicare Advantage and Part D Plans,
ONLINE SAN MATEO COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, Feb. 2007, www.smcma.org/
Bulletin/BulletinIssues/Feb07issue/ExecutiveReport.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); AM. MED.
ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 1001: DEEMED PARTICIPATION AND MISLEADING
MARKETING BY MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRIVATE FEE FOR SERVICE PLANS, available at www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/475/1001.doc (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 197–98 (explaining that because PFFS bids are
not subject to CMS bid negotiation, PFFS plans can garner increased profits).
213. See PICARD, supra note 145, at 11-13. Furthermore, there is evidence that many
PFFS-plan benefit structures impose greater out-of-pocket spending on sicker beneficiaries
compared with other forms of MA plans and Medigap plans. Marsha Gold, Medicare
Advantage in 2006-2007: What Congress Intended?, 2007 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W445,
W453.
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However, there is one limitation on the deeming provision that may put
some breaks on the rapid migration of beneficiaries to PFFS plans.
Although deemed providers do not get to negotiate the terms and
conditions that plans impose on them, they do have the option of not
providing services to a PFFS-enrolled patient seeking care.214 Further, a
provider that is deemed a contracting provider for an enrollee for one visit
does not have to provide services to that enrollee during subsequent visits.
Nor does the provider have to provide services to other enrollees in the
same plan. In other words, a provider may accept the terms of the PFFS
plan on an enrollee-by-enrollee and service-by-service basis.215
Recent reports from Medicare beneficiary advocacy groups216 and
anecdotal newspaper articles217 suggest that providers are refusing to see
PFFS enrollees, as is permitted under the deeming provision. For providers,
the choice is a difficult one of feeling “forced into an unacceptable choice
of either abandoning established patients who sign up for PFFS plans or
having to accept the terms of participation.”218 In short, the deeming
provision at the core of the PFFS model significantly advantages PFFS plans
over other plans and, along with substantial overpayments, the traditional
Medicare program. Yet, because PFFS plans cannot actually ensure
beneficiaries access to deemed providers, it is still unstable in terms of
access to care.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 2007, the Medicare Advantage program is providing an affordable,
high value choice for all Medicare beneficiaries. Enrollment is at an all-time

214. Gold, supra note 213, at W451.
215. PICARD, supra note 145, at 10.
216. See, e.g., LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166.
217. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Hard Sell Cited as Insurers Push Plans to Elderly, N.Y. Times,
May 7, 2007, at A1.
218. Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of David
Lipschutz, California Health Advocates, Los Angeles, California), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=printfriendly&id=5966 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2007) (quoting American Medical Association House of Delegates, New Mexico
Delegation, “Deemed Participation and Misleading Marketing by Medicare Advantage Private
Fee for Service Plans” Late Resolution: 1001 (I-06), received October 25, 2006); see also
LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 7 (California Health Advocates, Medicare Rights Center)
(Jan. 2007) (“Early experience with PFFS plans available in 2006, though, shows that
enrollees have had difficulty finding doctors who will agree to treat them while in other cases
providers have discovered retroactively that they are ‘deemed’ to be under contract to the plan
and must accept the terms and payment of the plan. Similarly, many doctors are expressing
frustration with these plans, including the fact that in some instances the plans can reimburse
doctors at rates less than standard Medicare reimbursement rates.”).
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high and plans are available in every region of the country, including rural
areas. Medicare Advantage (MA) plans are a particularly important option
for lower-income and minority beneficiaries.
The value and availability of plans is a direct result of Congressional
policies establishing minimum rates for MA plans in some regions where the
MA option was not yet available. These policies were established to ensure
wide availability of MA plans and to do so, in part, by providing extra
benefits to enrollees.
Beneficiaries should be able to have a choice of alternative delivery
systems and MA plans have the flexibility to deliver innovative care
management that is not encouraged in the FFS system. Eliminating the
policies that have led to the wide-spread availability of MA plans could limit
beneficiary access to these alternative delivery systems, and the care
management services they can provide. While it is unclear how plans or
beneficiaries would react, we know that before these policies were enacted,
particularly those in the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), far fewer
beneficiaries had a choice of a private plan.219

It is not unusual for political leadership, including senior officials at an
agency like CMS, to advocate in relation to the programs they have
responsibility for administering. However, the quote cited here is from the
introduction to an unsigned report on the state of Medicare Advantage in
2007, which, at the time of this writing, was featured on the home page of
the CMS Web site. It is presented not as a viewpoint of political leadership
but, rather, as an objective review of the state of the MA program as
Congress considers partly leveling the playing field on which MA plans are
thriving. The document continues at some length to present one-sided,
misleading, or distorted information and some propaganda to support the
policy status quo.220
The CMS Web site221 is not directed specifically toward beneficiaries
facing the choice of either staying in traditional Medicare or joining a
private plan alternative. However, this fairly obvious attempt to influence
congressional consideration of MA payment reductions suggests an unusual
agency boosterism for private plans that contributes to an un-level playing
field for competition between private plans and traditional Medicare. This
article reviewed other less than even-handed implementation of what
Congress authorized, including spin in Handbooks sent to all beneficiaries,
lax oversight of marketing abuses, and decisions to use the risk adjustment
system for modifying plan payments to send extra money to plans even after
219. CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, supra note 8, at 3.
220. Id.
221. Medicare: The Official U.S. Government Site for People with Medicare,
www.Medicare.gov (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
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Congress provided large increases to plans in their base payment rates
under the MMA.
In the late 1990s, conservative advocates of market-based Medicare
restructuring asserted that CMS could not evenhandedly administer the
Medicare+Choice program because it had a basic conflict between
operating the traditional program and “establishing and managing the
market for the increasing range of plans that are offered to seniors at a
monthly premium.”222 No organizational changes occurred at that time
despite these concerns about CMS’s will and ability to administer
evenhandedly.
Now, CMS boosterism threatens to undermine the
traditional Medicare program by making operational policy that favor
private plans.
Clearly, any attempt to formally define the element of level-playing-field
competition among private plans and between private plans and traditional
Medicare needs to again address the issue of where administrative
responsibility should be lodged and what governance protections are
needed to ensure that Congress’s intent is being even handedly
implemented.
This article has attempted to identify the major reasons why the playing
field between private health plans and traditional Medicare is tilted and offer
suggestions for correction. However, more fundamentally, there needs to
be an immediate debate about whether there should even be a level playing
field and, if so, how to achieve and maintain it. This debate would include
issues that go beyond the scope of this article, such as the extent to which
the traditional program should be permitted to manage care and costs as a
competing plan, albeit with some restraints that might not apply to private
plans. Additionally, this discussion needs to consider whether an array of
private plan types should be promoted regardless of whether they offer
important alternative choices to the traditional program or whether, as is the
case for R-PPOs and the PFFS plans, private plans that are essentially
traditional Medicare look-alikes are being advantaged primarily to
undermine the government-administered traditional Medicare program. In
the meantime, the quickest and most effective action Congress can take
would be to reduce or eliminate the current overpayments that MA plans
enjoy.

222. Restructuring Medicare for the Next Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Stuart M. Butler, Vice President for Domestic and Policy
Studies, The Heritage Foundation), available at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/Test
052799.cfm (“It is a very basic principle of economic organization in a market that those
responsible for setting the rules of competition, and providing consumers with information on
rival products, should have neither an interest in promoting any particular product nor even a
close relationship with one of the competitors.”).
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